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ETHIOPIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

by Alemante G. Selassie*

In May 1991, the much hated and brutal military-Marxist dictatorship that
traumatized Ethiopians for seventeen years was finally overthrown. The major military,
if not the political, forces responsible for the demise of the dictatorship (known as the
"Derg" in Amharic) were the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Upon the fall of the Derg,
the EPRDF quickly proceeded to assume "state responsibility" pending the formation of
a transitional government.
With the demise of the Derg and the apparent end of the civil war that ravaged
the country for over two decades, the call for "peace, democracy, and the rule of law"
is on everyone's lips - at home and abroad. Not uncommonly, after two decades of a
cruel civil war and a brutal dictatorship, these ideals have captured the imagination of
large numbers of people.
Accordingly, on July 1, 1991, the EPRDF called a national conference that
culminated in the adoption of a Transitional Period Charter to function as an interim
constitution. Pursuant to the Charter, a Council of Representatives was set up to govern
the nation until a permanent government could be elected. The following year, local and
regional elections were held, ostensibly as part of the effort to lay down the basis for a
constitutional government in the future. Seventeen months later, the EPRDF continues to
struggle for control of the nation and faces severe criticism for its failure to institute
democracy.
To be sure, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as part
of the Charter by the national conference is a propitious step on the road to democracy.
The affirmation of these rights, in a country whose immediate past has been characterized
by the grossest abuses, is historic and should stir the heart. Similarly, the Charter's
affirmation of the right of ethnic groups to develop their languages, cultures, and history
is an appropriate response to the ethnic question that has bedeviled the Ethiopian state in
the last two decades.
Notwithstanding these positive developments, it is accurate and warranted to
characterize the EPRDF's efforts as a failure. The failure to shepherd Ethiopia into a
democratic state is evident in the very process by which the institutions of the transitional
government were created and the Charter was adopted. The EPRDF deliberately excluded
opposition groups when developing the legal and institutional framework for the new
government., The EPRDF has further undermined the prospects for democracy by
employing violent and undemocratic tactics to upset election proceedings in order to
maintain power. The upshot of these policies is the illegitimate concentration of political
power in the hands of the EPRDF and the absence of any demarcation between it, as the
dominant party, and the state - a situation that confirms the French saying: the more
things change, the more they are the same.

. Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The
author would like to thank Belinda Hatzenbuhler and Christine Renda for their valuable research assistance
in preparing this article.
New Deal for Ethiopia, THE TIMES, May 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 'Times File.
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1.HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The reasons for EPRDF's failure are tightly wound up in Ethiopia's history, a
past from which the country may not escape in the near future. Unlike the American
belief in the "self-evident" truth that government springs from the will of the people,
nations like Ethiopia have long held beliefs that power is derived from and located in an
independent source.2 Claiming legitimacy as descendants of King Solomon and the Queen
of Sheba, the Emperors that ruled Ethiopia for more than two thousand years were the
source of all law, and were subject to no rule but their own. 3 Indeed, the individual was
treated in law as a subject, not a citizen. The militaristic Derg that assumed control in
1974 derived its power initially from possession of the instrument of oppression (the
barrel of the gun), which it then sought to legitimize by the universality of its socialist
theories. It deemed nonacceptance of its program illegitimate, and branded anyone who
disagreed a counterrevolutionary. 4
The autocratic and totalitarian regimes that ruled Ethiopia until 1991 instilled no
democratic tradition in the people; rather, dictators rose to power quickly and easily in a
political culture that glorified and rewarded military strongmen. Ethiopia has had only
these governments of men. The democratic ideal of the rule of law was never nurtured
nor allowed to flourish among the people, who, instead, have been steeped in the strict
tradition of absolutism. Thus, in its transition to a constitutional government, Ethiopia has
neophyte citizens, and the present struggle for democracy is proving doubly difficult.
A. Limited Vision of the 1931 Constitution
In 1931, as part of his drive to reform and modernize Ethiopia, Emperor Haile
Selassie endowed his people with the country's first constitution. It was promulgated in
the spirit of a contract between the Emperor, representing the Solomonian dynasty, and
the people as a whole. 5 Haile Selassie, however, regarded the constitution as a gift to his
people, which he gave "unasked and of Our own free will." 6
The 1931 Constitution institutionalized a government responsible to the Emperor.
While it established a parliament of two houses, Article 34 reserved full confirmation
powers for the Emperor and effectively stripped the putative lawmaking body of its
legislative role. The broadest power bestowed upon the Senate was the right to ask
permission to discuss their own subjects rather than being restricted to those the Emperor
put before them. 7
Haile Selassie personally appointed the members of the Senate, and delegated the
authority for appointing the Chamber of Deputies to the nobility until such time as the people

2 Many European nations share Ethiopia's notion of being given rights by elites representing the state.
In Poland, for example, its constitutions have never been perceived by the citizens as social contracts, as
grants of power given to the government by the free people. Instead, the constitution was seen at times as a
grant of privileges given by the sovereign state power to the population. Some earlier Polish constitutions
acted only as a limit imposed on the power of the King by the nobility. Yet, in no way was the constitution
ever a product of Poland's popular will. Wiktor Osiatyfiski, The Constitution-Making Process in Poland, 13
LAW & POL'Y 125, 128 (1991).
3 Their omnipotence is illustrated in the Emperors' title: "Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah,
Elect of God, King of the Kings of Ethiopia." MARGERY PERHAM, THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA 71
(1969).
4

6

EDMOND J. KELLER, REVOLUTIONARY ETHIOPIA 198 (1988).

PERHAM, supra note 3, at 71.
Id. at 96.

7 Id.
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were considered ready to assume the task for themselves.8 In handpicking the members of the
senate, Haile Selassie chose both a young, new elite who would be necessarily sympathetic to
him, and members of the old nobility who, upon relocation to the capital, Addis Ababa, were
gracefully relieved of their local responsibilities and power.
Although the Emperor appeared to be establishing a basis for the rule of law, the
parliament was in fact powerless and merely a vehicle for the continued consolidation of
his authority. The genius of this new arrangement, from Haile Selassie's perspective, was
that it created the illusion of a modem parliamentary system and placated would-be critics
while destroying the old power bases and further concentrating absolute power into his
own hands. 9
B. The Inadequacy of the 1955 Constitution
Five short years after the 1931 Constitution was introduced, the Italian occupation
forced Haile Selassie to flee the country. Italy did much in a very brief period to destroy
the Ethiopian empire by introducing modem economic institutions. When Haile Selassie
returned to power in 1941, he was compelled by the people's newly formed expectations
to continue the modernizing trend with a host of political, economic, and social reforms.
Contributing to the modernizing trend were the themes of independence and selfgovernance, predominant in many other African countries during the years following
World War II.10 Haile Selassie was swept along by this current of political progress. In
1955, he introduced a revised constitution which provided for the popular election of the
Chamber of Deputies, an increase in parliamentary authority, and a modest, though still
far from satisfactory, recognition of personal liberties.
Differing considerably from its 1931 counterpart, the new constitution embodied
significant changes: the acknowledgment of separation of powers, the introduction of a
popularly elected body with actual legislative ability,"' and the inclusion of twenty-nine
articles addressing the rights of the people. Sadly, as with the few rights that were granted
by the first constitution, these new rights were subject to suspension for any perceived
threat to national security.' 2
The Ethiopian people remained without any true democratic institutions, yet, they
had the concept of the monarchy as a guiding social myth that served to maintain basic
order. The legitimacy of the Emperor was unquestioned by most. This fact, though, did
not give the emperor freedom to wield absolute power. His power was unlimited by law,
but it was somewhat constrained by tenets of religion, widely adhered to among his
people. A certain amount of benevolence was built-in to his rule by virtue of this religious
influence. Segments of the population, however, continued to strive for greater freedom
than was ever accorded by Haile Selassie. In 1974, their discontent erupted in a military
coup.
C. Lost Chance in 1974
The coup destroyed the ancient empire, completely and irrevocably. It has been
said the revolution belonged to the people, who reacted to Haile Selassie's ineffective and

I ETH. CONST. of 1931 arts. 31-32.
9 PETER SCHWAB, HAILE SELASSIE I: ETHIOPIA'S LION OF JUDAH 51-52 (1979).
'0 KELLER, supra note 4, at 83.

" The only law ever enacted by this body was one to increase the salaries of its members. BABILE
TOLA, TO KILL A GENERATION: THE RED TERROR IN ETHIOPIA 14 (1989).
2 See ETH. CONST. of 1931 arts. 22-29, and ETH. CONST. of 1955 arts. 37-65.

WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:2

corrupt feudo-imperial regime that had been in power for forty-four years. The military's
cohesiveness and firepower, however, were the decisive factors in making the revolution
successful. In fact, the Derg, as a "self-proclaimed vanguard, wanted to be the guardian
' '
of the revolution. 13
Lacking the legitimacy that accompanied the monarchs of the previous two
millennia, the Derg realized that the task of refashioning society on the underpinnings of
entirely new institutions would be difficult without a social myth of its own. 4 At this
juncture, the opportunity to move toward democracy was rejected. With reverberations
from the Vietnam War still resounding among the intelligentsia, the Derg gradually
spurned United States' influence. Socialist ideas were in vogue. Thus, influenced by the
mounting pressures for a revolutionary solution and a need for legitimacy, the Derg
proclaimed Ethiopia a new socialist state with "national progressive unity" as its goal. 5
With the benefit of hindsight, 1974 can be seen as a missed opportunity for Ethiopia to
embark upon the road to democracy. Yet, at the time, the Derg was adamantly opposed
to the importation of any foreign philosophies, wanting its form of communalism to be
born of the population, inspired by ideals such as equality, justice, and cooperation. 6
On December 20, 1974, the Derg began the formal embodiment of its ideals.
First it claimed to believe in national unity above all by popularizing the slogan Ethiopia
Tikdem (Ethiopia First). In the following months, the Derg implemented some of its
economic policies by nationalizing all major enterprises and instituting a land reform
program that ultimately ended up nationalizing all rural land, 7 despite the contrary
intentions of the original architects of the program. The land nationalization policy is an
example of the Derg's misguided efforts. By nationalizing land, the Derg defeated the
expectations of the peasantry, gradually destroyed the traditional farm system, and laid the
groundwork for famines to recur with frequent regularity.
On the political plane, no sooner had the Derg assumed state power than it found
itself facing a mounting civilian opposition. The opposition was divided along ethnic and
ideological lines, but it was united by a common refusal to accept the military
government's claim to rule. It was also united by a common demand for the respect of
democratic rights, including the rights of ethnic groups to cultural self-determination. The
military, rather than accommodating the opposition by sharing power, sought to stamp out
opposition through a massive campaign of terror and repression.
In mid-1970 the Derg announced the Program for the National Democratic
Revolution (PNDR), which incorporated the newly adopted principles of Soviet-style
scientific socialism and established a body similar to the Soviet Politburo. The rise of
Mengistu Haile-Mariam in 1977 accompanied this alignment with the Soviet bloc.'"
Intolerance of any opposition, including peaceful protest, and a willingness to use force
to stem opposition, soon revealed the Derg as a complete and brutal dictatorship.' 9 The
modicum of democratic rights bestowed on the people by Haile Selassie quickly faded as
this "Red Terror" period unfolded. This great oppression gradually led many opposition
movements to take to the hills; others that were already there intensified their struggles
in pursuit of their respective goals. For example, the ranks of the Eritrean movements
swelled solely as a result of the Derg's repressive policies.

13 TOLA,

supra note 11,at 25.

14 KELLER, supra note 4, at 191.

"5 Id. at 193.
16

id.

Id. at 193-94.
I'
ld. at 200.
'9 TOLA, supra note I1,
at 54.
'7
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Mengistu Haile-Mariam fled the country on May 21, 1991, after seventeen years
of civil and ethnic strife. The Derg finally attempted what appeared to be true conciliatory
efforts with the EPRDF and the EPLF, whose forces were closing in on Addis Ababa in
the center and Asmara to the north. The EPRDF, speaking to the masses, derided these
overtures: "The people are telling [the Derg] today like before: changing the stove will
not make the soup taste better." 2" The Derg finally fell on May 28, 1991.
While the rest of the world was celebrating the end of totalitarianism, the
Ethiopian people were wary and suspicious of the new rulers pretending to take
power in the people's name. The overnight renunciation of Marxist-Leninist
ideology and the formal adoption of democratic ideals by the new rulers was not
convincing to the Ethiopian who had grown up amid the same authoritarian
atmosphere that, until recently, had been the sustenance of the EPRDF. Arguably,
the population of Ethiopia was not ready for the transition even if it believed the
propaganda. A society steeped in authoritarianism has generally fewer expectations
and is less schooled in the ways of democracy than a constituency traditionally
given a say in its governance.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION

A prognosis for the democratic transition presently taking place in Ethiopia
requires both an analysis of the general process of transition and an analysis of the
transition within the Ethiopian framework. The two major ways to transform a government
are discussed below. This discussion is followed by an introduction to the party
responsible for the transition in Ethiopia and the particular process it has employed thus
far.
A. Two Different Methods of Transition
1. The Negotiated Transition
The term 'negotiated transition' implies a peaceful transition. It is non-violent,
and negotiated in the sense that the existing government agrees to meet with the
opposition elements to discuss and implement the goals of the transition. All political
parties are involved in the process to ensure that the new system represents the will of all
the people.
While the purpose of the negotiation is to arrange a new political order, the
parties agree that the institutions of the existing government will remain in place and be
refashioned only to the extent necessary to carry out the country's new objectives. They
envision, therefore, a political reorganization with as little administrative disruption as
possible. This approach avoids the necessity of building a new government from the
ground up and is especially useful when the existing institutions are readily adaptable to
the form of the new government.
Once the parties agree that the existing institutions can be manipulated to
accommodate the transitional government, the next step is to write the new constitution.
The decision to amend a pre-existing constitution or adopt a new one could profoundly
affect the dynamics of the new state. It is a choice that implicates the relationship between
the old ruling party and the new government, the allocation of power within the new

20

Commentary on Denying Dergues 'Breathing Space,' F.B.I.S., May 23, 1991, at 4.
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government itself, or between the center and the component units of the state. This
decision was faced by the Czech and Slovak republics in December 1990.2"
An additional issue the new government must address is the extent to which it
will allow the existing institutions to dictate the character of the new system. When the
old regime's constitution is merely amended to reflect the changes of the new political
system, the tendency is for institutions to change only "in ways which those institutions
themselves permitted: ' 22 This fact "may throw the revolutionary character of the
changes into doubt" if we accept the proposition that "political revolutions aim to change
political institutions in ways which those institutions prohibit. ' 2 3 Consequently, the
approach the new government takes in reforming the system foreshadows the extent to
which it will be committed to revolutionary reform.24 The more the new regime is
willing to mold the existing institutions to meet the needs of the modern political system,
the greater are its chances for prolonged legitimacy.
A willingness to meet the needs of the modem political system encompasses a certain
amount of self-effacement. Rather than displacing the old regime for a new and improved (but
essentially the same) regime, the transitional parties must regard themselves as conduits for the
creation of a new brand of politics altogether. 2 Implicit in this arrangement is the agreement
among all participants that they submit to the will of the people, and that the new institutions
will become the law of the land, constraining all, including those who negotiated the
settlement.26 A negotiated transition and the resulting constitution, as products of an allinclusive agreement, are thereby legitimized as integral components of a democracy.
2. The Non-Peaceful Transition
A non-peaceful, or forced transition is an expression of revolutionary forces
unaccustomed to democratic ideology. The usurpers of state power divest the existing
government of its authority and embody their political agenda in a constitution that
perpetuates their power.27

21 The Czecho-Slovak debate over power allocation in the post-revolution federation centered on the
distinction between a "from the top" devolution of power and a "from below" creation of power. "The
real issue [was] the nature and extent of the powers conferred on the central authority that determine the
viability of the common state in given historic conditions." The Slovaks questioned the legitimacy of the
devolution of power from the central authority to the component units and pointed out that in the more
successful federations, the individual components created a common constitution. Eric Stein, Devolution or
Deconstruction Czecho-Slovak Style, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 786, 795 (1992).
22 Ulrich K. Preuss, The Politics of Constitution Making: Transforming Politics into Constitutions,
13
LAW & POL'Y 107, 112 (1991).
23 id.

24 The people of central and eastern Europe responded to this challenge by radically changing the
existing political systems in their respective countries. They embraced the challenges of constitutionalism
and used it as a unifying power in the elimination of communism. It cannot be claimed, however, that the
constitution expressed the unified will of the people. In the post-communist countries the people do not
know what their will is, or what it will be, because "they have not yet had the opportunity to mold it in
deliberative democratic processes." Therefore, constitution making is regarded as the outcome of a
deliberative process in which the will of the people is determined and from which the whole exercise is
legitimized. Id. at 113.
2' Borrowing another example from the eastern and central European countries illustrates this idea.
The political forces involved in the Round Table Talks decided that they all would be subjected to the

constitutional rules they had created; the existing government would have to relinquish its monopoly on
power, and at the same time, the power of the opposition forces would be determined by the will of the
people. Id. at 115.
26 Id. at 107.
27 id.
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The absence of a consensual decision-making process is glaring. The new leaders,
having stepped into the shoes of their predecessors, assume state power and unilaterally
lay the groundwork for the new system.
The resulting relationship is one in which the rulers proclaim their right to
govern, disregarding that the ruled have neither consented nor recognized a duty to
obey.28 The constitution thereby becomes "a peaceful surrogate for a permanent
revolution," 29 albeit one that is "only as durable as the conditions that generated the last
political victory. ' 3' The government that employs this transitional process is inherently
unstable. This government is not legitimized by the popular will of the people, but rather
by wielding enough power to keep its opposition elements in submission.
Ethiopia's situation essentially fits this description. To appreciate this, it is
necessary to identify the major actors in the Ethiopian "transition," the role they have
played in the process, and the political objectives they seek to attain.
B. The Actors
Repression of ideological adversaries under the Derg spawned many ethnic-based
rebel groups. The largest of these have been the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
(TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF). Collectively these would form the major ethnic movements "responsible" for the
overthrow of the military regime in 1991.
The TPLF developed in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. An ethnically coherent
highland territory and a fundamental part of the country since its ancient origins, the
Tigray region has historically resisted rule by the national government, which it perceived
to be dominated by Shoan-Amharas. This perception ultimately led the TPLF to call for
a restructuring of the Ethiopian political system to allow for democratic equality among
ethnic groups and to achieve a meaningful regional autonomy that was not attainable
under the Derg. 3I Due to the relatively small population of Tigray, however, the TPLF
was forced to seek alliances with other ethnic groups.32 The need to mobilize ethnic
groups led to "an incongruous Stalinism ...and to an admiration for Albania as a state
which combined rigid Marxism-Leninism with the exclusion from the international
socialist community which was imposed on the TPLF by the Mengistu regime's alliance
with the Soviet Union." 33
On the other hand, the driving force of the EPLF, and at times the more radical
wing of the OLF, has been independence for their respective regions.34 The EPLF
dominates the highland coastal region of Eritrea. The OLF, perhaps representing the
largest ethnic group in the nation, is based in the most fertile and economically stable
regions to the south.

Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State, 4 THE HARRIMAN INsT. F. 1, 5 (1991).

29 Preuss, supra note 22, at 107.
30 Id. at 108.

" Christopher Clapham, Ethiopia: The Politics of Deconstruction, in DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS FOR
1990s 3 (Lancaster, 1991).

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA IN THE
32

Id.

33 id.
34 Although Eritrea constituted Ethiopia's Red Sea province in historical times, it became an Italian

colony during the late nineteenth century until 1941, when Britain administered it as a U.N. trusteeship. In
1952, the United Nations decided to join Eritrea with Ethiopia in a federal arrangement. Ten years later,
Haile Selassie dissolved the federation, thereby igniting a 30-year struggle for independence. Eritrea was
granted independence in the first draft of the transitional charter. Although this provision was not adopted in
the final draft, the EPRDF recognizes Eritrean independence pending a referendum by the Eritrean people.
The more radical wing of the OLF demands an independent state of Oromia.
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The EPRDF was created in 1989 by the joinder of the TPLF and the Ethiopian
People's Democratic Movement (EPDM). 35 Eventually it would become an umbrella
organization for myriad groups joined in opposition to the brutality of the Derg.36
Although the EPRDF embraces various organizations, the TPLF dominates the EPRDF
to such an extent that EPRDF has been considered a deceptive euphemism for the TPLF.
In turn, many regard the TPLF as a trojan horse for the EPLF.
In 1990, the EPRDF announced its rejection of the Marxist-Leninist ideology
formerly espoused by the TPLF in a "lightning shift to democratic ideals and free-market
policies," 37 and asserted that it had supported a multi-party transitional government since
1988.38 Meles Zenawi, then chairman of the EPRDF and now president of Ethiopia,
stated, disingenously and unconvincingly, that the movement "has never been a Marxist
organization," reiterating his commitment to a "consistently democratic political
system."'9
In March 1990, then Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile-Mariam also announced
his view that the country was abandoning Marxism and going over to a mixed
economy. ° This policy reform came too late, however, to have its intended effect. The
rebel groups continued their struggle to achieve their objectives. Realizing that it could
not win by military strength, the Derg government was eventually forced to submit to
peaceful means for resolution of the conflict. Purporting to accept the claims of rebel
groups, the government established a peace commission on May 8, 1991. The plan was
to open dialogue among all groups to find a lasting solution for the country and its future
political situation. 4
Yet, it was not until the rebels were closing in on the capital that Mr. Herman
Cohen, United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, initiated the socalled London peace talks on May 27, 1991. The talks included the EPRDF, the EPLF,
and the OLF.42 The EPRDF demanded that Mengistu Haile-Mariam step down and that

35 Ethiopia: From Rebels to Rulers, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, May 31, 1991, at 1.
36 Clapham, supra note 31, at 5. In 1980, the TPLF assisted in creating the EPDM, initially comprised

of ex-members of the EPRP, to gamer support in the central, largely Amharic-speaking areas of the country.
The EPDM, in turn, begat the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Force (EMLF), which supported Albanian style
Marxism. The EMLF closely associated itself with the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT), the
controlling and ideological element of the TPLF, and the two groups jointly set up the Ethiopian Workers'
Revolutionary Party to serve a similar role of control and ideological guidance for the EPRDF. Ethiopia:
From Rebels to Rulers, supra note 35, at 1. The Oromo People's Democratic Organisation was put together
in May 1990 by the TPLF, who needed an Oromo group in their coalition. It was created using former
prisoners of war from Mengistu's army. Scott Peterson, Ethiopians Head for Electoral Crossroads to Civil
War or Peace, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 28, 1992, Int'l at 10. The EPRDF started spreading to the
center, west, and south in the spring of 1991 and had not, by that time, finished establishing itself, according
to Meles Zenawi. Meles Zenawi on Composition of EPRDF, F.B.I.S., June 5, 1991, at 7.
17 EPRDF's Meles Zenawi Arrives in Addis Ababa, F.B.I.S., June 3, 1991, at 6.
38 EPRDF Spokesman on Addis Ababa Onslaught, F.B.I.S., May 29, 1991, at 3.
39 David Chazan, Ethiopia's Acting President Promises Broad Based Government, AFP, June 10,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File. Meles Zenawi had previously served as secretarygeneral of the MLLT, which controlled the Marxian ideology of the TPLF. Ethiopia: From Rebels to Rulers,
supra note 35, at 1.
0 Further on Resignation, F.B.I.S., May 21, 1991, at 6.
41 'Peace Commission' Set Up to Contact Opposition, F.B.I.S., May 9, 1991, at 10.
42 Significantly, the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEr)F) was excluded. The COEDF is
an umbrella organization comprising various parties including the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
(EPRP), which had waged armed struggle against the Derg for 17 years. There is no adequate justification
for this other than the fact that the COEDF, unlike the participants of the London Conference, is a multiethnic movement of opposition forces. Initially, the Derg was involved, but its members walked out when
they discovered the pre-existing plan of the United States to remove them from power. The OLF, although it
maintained its presence at the peace talks in London, also left with the feeling that the U.S. and the EPRDF
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a broad based government be set up that would represent all the country's ethnic groups.
The EPLF, whose primary aim was self-determination for Eritrea,43 insisted that Eritrea
be given autonomy until such time as the Eritrean people could vote for independence.
The plan devised during the peace talks was to organize a conference before July 1 to
create a transitional government that would govern Ethiopia for two years, pending
44
democratic elections, and to grant the EPLF's demands for an independent state.
C. The Process of Transition
What many hailed as the end of a thirty year civil war45 can more accurately be
described as a shift in power. The old perception of Amhara domination of the state has
given way to a new perception of Tigrayan domination. In place of the democratic
equality of ethnic groups that the TPLF once advocated, there is a noticeable ascendancy
of Tigrayan domination of the chief instruments of state power, especially the army, the
security, and the top echelons of the bureaucracy. Consequently, many ethnic and multiethnic rebel groups have refused to accept the ascendancy of the EPRDF as the
controlling element in the new, supposedly democratic government and have expressed
their antagonism in continued fighting. Thus, even after May 1991, the EPRDF could not
rest as the undisputed victor, but has been forced to continue battling for control. 6
Notwithstanding this resistance, the EPRDF has sought to establish a firm
stronghold in Ethiopia, institutionalizing and attempting to legitimize its power by forming
a transitional government, drafting a constitution, and holding elections. Some of these
changes might well represent the foundations upon which a democracy must be built. The
means employed to achieve these ends, however, signify that the EPRDF remains bound
by its authoritarian past and is unable and unwilling to accommodate, much less nurture,
any progress in democratic governance.
1. The Procedurefor Transition
a. Institutionalizationof Power
In accordance with the agreement reached at the London peace talks, a
"Democracy Conference," aimed at creating a transitional government that would
organize a new constitution and multi-party elections was held from July 1-5, 1991. More
than twenty political fronts, organizations, and movements, as well as representatives of
various nationalities and numerous local and foreign observers, gathered together to
establish the transitional government and to help chart the course of Ethiopia in a sea of
burgeoning democratic movements around the world.47
The various political groups "agreed" to an EPRDF-mandated power-sharing
plan, which created a Council of Representatives consisting of eighty-seven seats.

had made an agreement prior to the talks. While the opportunity for a negotiated transition seemed at hand,
the chance for a peaceful shift to democracy was illusory.
4" Unity Among Opposition Fronts Called 'Fragile', F.B.I.S., May 16, 1991, at 6.
OLF Expresses 'Dissatisfaction' With U.S. Role, F.B.I.S., May 31, 1991, at 7.
4 The "Thirty-year civil war" describes the length of time Eritrea fought for independence, beginning
during Haile Selassie's reign in 1961.
46 Interim PresidentDenies 'Conspiracy' With U.S., F.B.I.S., June 4, 1991, at 5.
47 'Democracy Conference' Opens; Meles Elected Chair, F.B.I.S., July 3, 1991, at 5. As before, the
COEDF was excluded from participating in the conference, the lame excuse being that it had declared war
against the transitional government. Ironically, however, the ostensible reason for its exclusion from the
London conference was its lack of an armed force.
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Although the basis for the allocation of council seats remains somewhat of a mystery,"
thirty-two seats were reserved for the EPRDF, twelve for the OLF, and the remaining
forty-three seats for twenty-two other groups."
The conference participants concluded their deliberations by unanimously
adopting the views respecting democratic rights and the unlimited human and political
rights of individuals and peoples5" that were embodied in the Transitional Charter
presented by the EPRDF.? On July 22, 1991, following the Peace Conference, the
Council of Representatives unanimously elected Meles Zenawi chairman of the transitional
council and head of state. Two of the three nominated candidates stepped down to allow
Meles to stand unopposed for election, 52 a gesture not unlike the normal election process
in many dictatorial African nations.
b. Setting up the Frameworkfor Elections
In furtherance of the Transitional Charter's provision for regional elections, the
Council of Representatives established an Electoral Commission to supervise the electoral
process. The objective of the Commission was to create favorable conditions so that
regional and local elections could be held by the end of the first week in June 1992." 3
The commission created electoral committees at the zonal, district, and kebele (neighborhood) levels, and provided guidelines for the election of committee members.
The Council of Representatives also adopted a draft decree on the establishment
of an ethnic-based administration of the transitional period in Ethiopia. The decree
allowed "nations, nationalities, and peoples" to establish "national transitional
administrations" within their own geographical areas to effectuate self-governance.
Subsequently, fourteen transitional administrative organs were empowered to elect their
own parliaments and to make decisions on regional legislation, official languages, and
internal security. While the national and regional administrations were afforded their own
structures and authority, overall political responsibility and authority was reserved by the
Council of Representatives for national, regional, district, and other administrative levels
in accordance with the Charter.54 Regional boundaries were redrawn by agreement
between the EPRDF and the OLF and with the approval of the Council of Representatives. The new boundaries were supposed to correspond with ethnicity, but in fact
reflected political power rather than strict ethnicity. Under these arrangements, the TPLF
was the biggest winner, for it gained rich farming lands in adjacent provinces in exchange
for its desert areas. The Somalis acquired territory as well, from certain Oromo areas that
they had not previously held. The Amharas were the clear losers in the ethnic redistricting
55
process.
The effect of the reconstitution of the country along purely ethnic lines will be
to further divide a country whose ethnic diversity has traditionally been a point of

'8 Supposed factors involved in the allocation include a) a group's contribution to the overthrow of the
Derg, b) the size of forces that they currently have mobilized, c) the size of the population that the group
claims to speak for, and d) insurance that the EPRDF does not have a majority on the council. Berhanu
Nega, Some Observations on Ethiopia's Transition to Democratic Politics, 2 IMBYLTA 16 (1991).
'9
Robert M. Press, Ethiopia's Ruling Rebels Move Toward Open Political System, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, July 23, 1991, (The World), at 5.
0 'Democracy Conference' Opens; Meles Elected Chair, supra note 51, at 6.
SI EPRDF Charter Adopted, F.B.I.S., July 5, 1991, at 7.
52 Meles Zenawi Elected Head of State, F.B.I.S., July 23, 1991, at 3-4.
53 Minister Urges Army to Shun Political Activity, F.B.I.S., March 24, 1992,
at 8.
5' National Administration Draft Decree Adopted, F.B.I.S., Nov. 21, 1991, at 2.
55 Ethiopia: New Government, New Map, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 8, 1991, at 7.
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contention. Recognition of strict ethnic divisions accentuates the differences among the
groups and encourages political organization along these lines. Furthermore, it creates a
fertile ground for inter-ethnic conflict. The net effect of this policy may very well be
similar to the situation that exists today in Yugoslavia, with people identifying themselves
as members of an ethnic group rather than as citizens of Ethiopia.
c. Setting the Tone of the Transition
The Charter is committed to respect for collective and individual rights,
guaranteeing both kinds of rights without ranking them according to their relative
importance. This is significant, for in an ethnically diverse nation, collective rights when
coupled with individual rights, offer greater possibilities for maintaining or attaining state
legitimacy, order, and stability than the individual rights alone. If properly handled,
respecting ethnic diversity through collective rights is a constitutional imperative, not a
mere policy choice. To be sure, collective rights are not without danger, a prominent one
being the Charter's affirmation of the right to secede.
The Charter creates autonomous regions defined purely in terms of ethnic
character so as to allow each ethnic group, or at least the dominant ones, to manifest their
identity throughout the region.56 Each of these groups is afforded the right to secede. It
appears that by granting the right to secede, the Charter legalizes the destruction of the
very union it purports to establish. The Charter suggests several reasons for this apparent
contradiction. The right to secede under the Charter only exists if an ethnic group's rights
to separate identity, language, culture, and autonomy are not respected. The argument
suggests that because these rights are fundamental to ethnic integrity, they would be
meaningless without a remedy. The right to secede is that remedy. Thus, those in favor
of the right might justify it as an effective deterrent to government violation of an ethnic
group's rights, arguing that a government faced with such a drastic sanction is unlikely
to risk incurring it. In addition, proponents might view the existence of the right to secede
as essential to allay ethnic fears and suspicions. Finally, experience suggests that
whenever ethnic movements play a central role in constitution making, the right to secede
figures prominently.
Creating a constitutional right to secede, however, is ill-advised as a practical matter
and ill-conceived as a matter of constitutional theory. As a practical matter, those convinced that
the right to secede is a self-evident truth have trouble realizing that secession has no stopping
point. Once started, the process spawns a never-ending cycle. Admittedly, the right to secede has
a great deal of political and psychological value. It is often loaded with "political and
psychological gunpowder,"57 thereby bolstering the political argument for independence. As
a practical legal matter, however, its value appears limited, if not nonexistent, for the right lacks
any legal mechanism for its enforcement.
As a matter of constitutional theory, the right to secede is also ill-conceived. A
constitution has value as a "pre-commitment strategy."5 To be successful, this strategy

56 According to Omar Ismail, Oromo deputy in the provisional parliament, one effect of the new
Ethiopian regime's acknowledgment of an individual's right to his ancient culture, language, and civilization
is that many are digging up ancient history in search of their historical roots and origins in order to define
their identities. For example, some Afari say they have brothers near the Egyptian borders in northern Sudan,
while others say the Afari people came from Iraq originally. The Oromo say that they are from the Near
East historically and that they are Semitic people originally. Ethnic Rivalries, Role of Oromos Examined,
F.B.I.S., Jan. 17, 1992, at 10.
" Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples'andMinorities, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 102,
108 (1976).
" Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 636 (1991).
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must ensure the peaceful and unhampered operation of democratic politics in the face of
severe ethnic differences. Recognizing a right to secede does not promote such a strategy.
In a society divided along ethnic lines, the right to secede is apt to lead to politics of
brinkmanship rather than cooperation among ethnic groups. Such a right would encourage
ethnic groups to engage in strategic behavior aimed at obtaining benefits or minimizing
burdens for their group alone.59
The promulgation of the right to secede in Ethiopia may have been due in part
to the transitional government's view of major inconsistencies between the Derg's
propaganda about autonomy and equality and its actions of encouraging disintegration
rather than unity of its peoples. 60 Viewing itself in a wholly different light due to
provisions in the Charter guaranteeing the people's right to self-determination, 6' the
transitional government purported to be truly "of the people." The major inconsistencies
in the transitional government's own assertions about a peoples' right to self-determination
became apparent when the EPRDF resisted OLF's claim of secession. Furthermore, the
transitional Council of Representatives has stated that while it backs the principle of selfdetermination laid out in the Charter, it will not tolerate the "creation of neighborhood
governments." 62 Yet, the transitional government's definition of a nation ostensibly
includes such an entity as a neighborhood government. 63 The EPRDF's credibility is
suffering as a result of this hypocrisy on the secession issue.
2. Evaluation of the Process
Although the demise of the Derg marked an historic moment for Ethiopia, the
"fundamental flaws" in the process of transition call into question the real chances of
democracy for a country haunted by an authoritarian tradition. The exclusionary policies
of the EPRDF comported with its former Marxist theories and negated its paper
commitment to a meaningful transition. Typical of a non-peaceful transition, the EPRDF's
representative actions include its banning of the official party of the former government
from participating in the transition process, acquiring absolute control of the instruments
of power, and interfering with the electoral process.
a. Beneath the Surface of the EPRDF's Proclamations
In one of its first official statements, the EPRDF pledged respect for human rights and
freedoms. One of the first actions taken by the new government, however, was the imposition
of a twenty-four hour curfew. Initially, the curfew may have been justified to ensure the safety
of the people and their property,' but the transitional government did not lift the curfew until
one year after its installation as the leading party of the nation.65

9 Id. at 648.
6 Afar Liberation Front Decries 'False Propaganda', F.B.I.S., Dec. 17, 1991, at 3.
6, The Charter specifies in Part 1, Article 2 that the right to self-determination of nations, nationalities,
and people is guaranteed. Subpart (c) of this Article provides that if the concerned nation, nationality, and
people feel that their rights have been denied, suppressed, or tampered with, they can implement their right
to self-determination, which includes independence. THE TRANSITIONAL CHARTER art. 2, part 1 (1991).
62 "A nation or nationality has been defined as those who live in one geographical area, who use a
single language and who have a common idea of unity." Government Decree on Local Election Conditions,
F.B.I.S., Dec. 23, 1991, at 3. It is under this definition that the OLF claims it represents a nation of Oromos.
63 EPRDF Given Go-Ahead on Dissent 'Crack Down', F.B.I.S., Nov. 25, 1991, at 7.
4 With approximately 80,000 guns unaccounted for when the EPRDF took control, the government had
a real fear for the safety of its citizens. President Declares 'War' on Oromos, F.B.I.S., June 29, 1991, at 3.
65 Government Announces Lifting of Remaining Curfews, F.B.I.S., May 28, 1992, at 2.
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Another immediate action taken by the EPRDF was a ban on all demonstrations.
On June 1, 1991, Mr. Meles admitted that the EPRDF had temporarily banned all public
demonstrations "to avoid ugly, armed confrontations." 66 Yet, at the same time, Amnesty
International expressed concern that the EPRDF was engaging in violence, particularly the
killing of nine demonstrators to disperse a demonstration during the first week of June.67
Although the international community was assured by Mr. Meles that the right to hold
peaceful demonstrations and to strike would soon be restored,68 it was not until August
12, 1991 that the government officially reinstated the right to demonstrate.69 Previously,
the EPRDF had specifically outlawed demonstrations organized by the former government's officials and members of its official party, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE).
The EPRDF also ordered WPE members to surrender all of their weapons and government
documents, and to turn themselves in to the new ruling party.7"
The EPRDF promulgated various other decrees early in the transition process to
"ensure" that democratic institutions would be incorporated into the new government. Yet, the
safeguards against government abuse built into these decrees give them no more credibility than
the "Constitutions" of Haile Selassie's day. For instance, Decree No. 6/1984 concerning the
utilization of state mass media states that the media should be available to various political
organizations as a vehicle through which to present their views to the public during the
transitional period.7 The decree purports to allow for utilization of the media by all organizations without favoritism, prohibits censorship of ideas, offers a choice of one or two languages,
and crimrinalizes blackmailing organizations through use of the media. Supposedly, the public
is to have a free forum in which to air their views. In practice, this has not occurred. The OLF
and other organizations have been forced to broadcast clandestinely.72 The freedom is also a
very qualified one, even under the decree, because it mandates that comments and criticism
directed to government officials must be free of baseless allegations, and the official criticized
is given the chance to reply to the criticism. Additionally, the State Council decides with respect
to all queries on the interpretation of this decree. In essence, the decree gives a freedom of
speech only to people who do not wish to criticize the government - a questionable freedom
indeed.

6

'Several Hundred' Killed in Explosion, F.B.I.S., June 3, 1991, at 8.

67

Id.

61

Id. at 9.

69 The Council of Representatives' decree on demonstrations reiterated the Article I stipulation of the

Transitional Charter that any person has the right to organize and participate in any peaceful demonstration
or popular political rally. The decree requires that any group or individual organizing a demonstration or
rally is obliged to give notice in writing at least 48 hours before the proposed rally. The notification letter
must contain a) the aim of the demonstration of the public political gathering, b) the venue of the
demonstrations, c) the date and time, d) the estimated duration, e) assistance needed from the government,
and f) the full name, address, and signature of the individual or group organizing the demonstration or public
political gathering. Towns or provincial offices have the responsibility of taking the necessary steps to
safeguard the peace, security, and daily lives of the people. A town or provincial office cannot prohibit the
holding of the demonstration or public political gathering at any time or place. The decree also contained
numerous prohibited areas and conditions for demonstrations, including the caveat that no demonstration or
public gathering is allowed to have discrimination or the spreading of rumors based on tribalism as its
objective. Additionally, the Workers Party of Ethiopia is prohibited from taking part in any political
movement. Meles Zenawi Issues Decree on Demonstrations, F.B.I.S., Aug. 16, 1991, at 1.
70 Officials Told to Surrender Within 48 Hours, F.B.I.S., May 30, 1991, at 6. See also Directive
Abolishes Defense, Interior Ministries, F.B.I.S., June 20, 1991, at 6 (text of June 16, 1991 directive by
acting Prime Minister, abolishing WPE and associations formed by it).
"' Decree on Media Use by Political Organizations, F.B.I.S., Nov. 22, 1991, at 7.
72 Many of the items published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service are received from such
clandestine broadcasts of the OLF and other organizations. See OLF Sets Conditions for Election
Participation, F.B.I.S., June 1, 1992, at 3, from (Clandestine) Voice of Oromo Liberation in Oromo.
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Other illustrations of the EPRDF's lack of respect for human rights and freedoms
include the manner by which law and order is maintained under the EPRDF. The EPRDF
has allowed summary executions of ordinary thieves; indiscriminate, warrantless searches
of houses; and incarceration of Derg officials without criminal proceedings being brought
against them.73 A Special Attorney General's Office was established by decree on
February 3, 1992 to investigate Derg-WPE crimes. The Office has the power to issue
warrants for the arrest of a person and for the search and seizure of property. 74 Though
the decree may represent some semblance of due process guarantees, the lack of
safeguards in this decree has enabled the EPRDF to use the Special Attorney General's
Office as an instrument for dealing with those who criticize or oppose the regime. In a
detailed report consisting of complaints based on eyewitness accounts and victim's reports,
the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) cited instances of this abuse where
persons have been detained throughout the country for alleged WPE crimes. These
individuals have been arrested and their property seized without any investigation or
proper legal criminal proceedings. The EHRCO report concluded that the transitional
government has pre-occupied itself with the Derg's human rights violations at the expense
of correcting ongoing human rights abuses.75
The EPRDF gives the appearance that it is a government committed to
democracy. Hidden beneath this surface is the EPRDF's genuine character. Although it
started out by saying all the right things, its actions have belied its words, exposing the
EPRDF's verbal democratic facade.
b. Major Flaws in the Transitional Conference Procedures
The manner in which the July 1, 1991 National Conference was held provides
further evidence of the foregoing conclusions regarding the EPRDF's empty commitment
to democracy. The conference was solely and exclusively organized and sponsored by the
EPRDF. It called the conference, prepared the agenda, and drew up the National Charter.
In addition, prior to the meeting, the EPRDF made agreements with the EPLF,
recognizing Eritrean secession, and made agreements with several other delegations over
seat allocations.76
A major flaw of the July 1 National Conference was the process by which
participants were admitted to the conference. Rather than devising consensual, clear, open,
and impartial criteria for admission to the conference and creating a democratic body to
apply these standards, the EPRDF unilaterally determined the right to participate in the
political process. Political parties and groups that disagreed with the EPRDF's political
and constitutional preferences were excluded. This exclusionary procedure is irreconcilable
with the EPRDF's condemnation of the Derg's authoritarianism and its own strident
avowal of democracy. It further evidences an intent on the part of the EPRDF to minimize
any opposition to its dominance in the new government.
Contrary to Meles Zenawi's statement prior to the conference that no organization would be excluded from the conference except for those that excluded themselves by
declaring war and following the path of war,77 three organizations were excluded: the
Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), the WPE and the monarchist

" Nega, supra note 48, at 11, 17.

'Special' Attorney General's Office Established, F.B.I.S., Feb. 5, 1992, at 4.
'5 Human Rights Group Issues Report on Detentions, F.B.I.S., July 20, 1992, at 4.
76 Ethiopia: Majorities and Minorities, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, July 12, 1991, at 2.
77 Interim Government President Gives News Conference, F.B.I.S., July 1, 1991, at 14.
74
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forces.78 None of these organizations had declared war. Although the WPE, as the
official party of the previous government may have had war-like intentions, it was in no
position to execute such intentions. Hated and discredited among the people, the defeated
WPE had neither the means nor the popular support to wage a war it had already lost. As
far as the COEDF and the royalists were concerned, there was little or nothing upon
which to justify their exclusion. Only by opening the arena to all opposition elements and
allowing all voices to be heard could the transitional process acquire some semblance of
a social contract. Such a compact is essential to true constitution-making and to
establishing a legitimate constitutional order. Unfortunately for the country, the
constitutional moment for such a compact was foolishly and selfishly passed up.
Furthermore, the participation of all political forces would have broadened the debate,
even if their participation would not have affected the outcome of the conference.
In addition, the EPRDF put some delegates in the unenviable position of having
to request a postponement of the conference in order to inform themselves on the matters
to be discussed, as the agenda and the proposed Transitional Charter were not distributed
to most of the delegates until the first day of the conference.79 In light of this, it is surely
permissible to wonder to what extent the Charter was a product of consensus, expressing
the fundamental and deliberated agreement of the participating groups to move toward a
transition to democracy.
More fundamentally significant was the exclusion of major sectors of the society from
participation. The conference attendees, all unelected elites, may have considered themselves
voices for the "nation," but by virtue of their status, they could not have truly represented the
diverse interests of "peasant associations, kebele associations, associations of women, youth,
students, teachers, lawyers, doctors and other professionals." 80 As a result, "the Ethiopian
people remained without any say about the form or content of the transitional process. Their role,
as before under the Derg, was that of a silent and captive audience."'"
c. The Result: Absolute Control by the EPRDF
In addition to determining participation in the July 1 conference, the EPRDF
assumed absolute control of all the significant events that occurred during and after the
conference. The mere fact that strategic offices, such as the president, the prime minister,
the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and the interior, were filled with EPRDF
members illustrates the powerful positioning of the EPRDF and how it has "allowed itself
to assume in the transitional process two roles simultaneously: as a player and as a
82
referee."
As previously mentioned, neither the basis for allocating council seats nor the
EPRDF's insistence that the Council not exceed eighty-seven members was ever fully
explained.83 What is clear, however, is that the EPRDF split itself up into its four
constituent parties for the purpose of acquiring seats. Although the TPLF agreed to take
only ten seats, it retained its dominant position by association with the other three parties
that comprise the EPRDF. Practically, politically, ideologically, and organizationally, the
TPLF and its three partners comprise a single and cohesive entity. The EPRDF thus gave

78 Nega, supra note 48, at 12.
79 Id.
80 Alemante Selassie, Recent Developments in Ethiopia: Prospectsfor Democratic Pluralism,
IMBYLTA, Fall 1991 at 2, 4.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 3.
83 Nega, supra note 48, at 16.
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the appearance of fostering power-sharing, while in fact it maintained its dominant
position and ensured that the other parties remained in the minority. 4 Moreover, now
that the OLF has pulled out of the transitional government, the EPRDF's hold on power
has become even more unassailable.
The EPRDF's virtual monopoly of power is apparent from yet another
perspective. In a democratic system of government, the monopoly over legitimate force
belongs to the state, not to a single political party. In light of this tenet, the EPRDF's
action of transforming its own TPLF armed force into the army of the state is disconcerting. The national army is merely an appendage of the EPRDF. Rather than being an
independent entity, it is responsible solely to the EPRDF. Its very existence is dependent
on the EPRDF's retention of power. Furthermore, it is troublesome that the army is
comprised almost exclusively of Tigrayans. It cannot claim to be a national army, even
to the extent that the Derg's army, being composed of diverse ethnic groups, could. The
Oromo majority of the Derg's army, allegedly controlled by Amharas, stands in sharp
contrast to this solely Tigrayan force. As long as the army's loyalty is to a single party,
the EPRDF, and not to the state, the EPRDF's regime will never achieve the legitimacy
afforded the victors in a truly democratic contest for power.
d. Botched Elections: Who is to Blame?
Democracy is defined as a government in which the supreme power is vested in
the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation.
An essential element of such a democratic system is free elections. Absent this element,
the premise on which the system of democratic governance is based crumbles.
Local and regional elections were held in many areas of the country on June 21,
1992. These elections should have validated the ostensible goal of achieving a democratic
transition. Instead, the EPRDF visibly demonstrated its inability to play by the rules of
the democratic game and to remove itself from the controlling position it has held since
driving the Derg out of Addis Ababa.
Early in the spring of 1992, ethnic groups began complaining that the EPRDF
was engaging in violent activities in contravention of its support for free and open
elections.85 The OLF vowed not to participate in the elections until all the necessary
conditions for free and fair elections were met, and the EPRDF army was confined to
barracks. 86 On June 17, 1992, the OLF withdrew from the elections. 7 In response to

Jean-Pierre Campagne, New Rulers Revive Old Style Vigilantes, Come Down on Foreign Press,
AFP, June 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
85 For example, in the Harerge region of Ethiopia, guerrillas from the Issa ethnic group fought the
8

EPRDF's army. The Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) charged thai the EPRDF had begun the
fighting and sent troops to patrol in their region just as the transitional government was talking about the
organization of free elections in autonomous regions. Issa Guerrillas Said Fighting Ethiopian Army, F.B.I.S.,
Mar. 25 1992, at 3. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) voiced complaints that the EPRDF forces
interfered in the affairs of the locally elected committees in Ogaden, a region bordering on Somalia. Ogaden
Front Official on Government Action, F.B.I..S, Apr. 22, 1992, at 6.
86 OLF Sets Conditions for Election Participation, F.B.I.S., June 1, 1992, at 3-4. Another 18 political
organizations and members of the Council of Representatives submitted a petition to the Electoral
Commission claiming that the countrywide regional and district elections would be sabotaged due to a
variety of inadequacies in the electoral scheme. The Electoral Commission and 45 of the 87 members of the
Council rejected the petition based on a lack of evidence; however, the Council decided to set up a
committee to investigate the matter in cooperation with the Electoral Commission.
87 After the OLF pulled out of the transitional government, efforts were made by foreign diplomats
to
bring it back into the political process, so far without success. On June 23, 1992 Edmund Keller was asked
to leave the country within 24 hours for violating the neutrality of the observer's agreement. U.S. Election

1992]

THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA

the complaints, and to prevent further withdrawal by ethnic groups in some regions of the
country, the Council of Representatives postponed the regional elections in some areas due
to "administrative problems encountered and particularly characteristic" of these areas.88
Notwithstanding these complaints, and the withdrawal of the OLF and other organizations,89 Meles Zenawi was adamant in his belief that the country was undergoing a
democratic transition."
The credibility of the transitional government, however, was severely damaged
by its election activities. Foreign observers confirmed the widespread belief that the
elections were marred by fraud, intimidation, and violence. The EPRDF emerged as the
clear victor in what essentially proved to be a one-party election. In the north, where the
elections were uncontested, it was a foregone conclusion that the EPRDF would claim all
the electoral votes, because the area was solidly controlled by the TPLF. In addition, the
situation in the south demonstrated that the EPRDF would not tolerate opposition. Among
other acts of intimidation and violence, political parties took control of the registration
process and made it difficult for supporters of opposition parties to register.9' Though
it should have done no better than to gain a minority of the votes, the EPRDF dominated
the elections in the highly contested race in the south, confirming the belief that the
EPRDF would never risk losing.
Since the elections, the EPRDF has sought to amend the mistakes that occurred
in the electoral process. On the whole, however, even if the mistakes are corrected, it is
not easy to dispel the widespread feeling that the EPRDF has broken its promises to
uphold civil rights and to ensure that the transitional process would be democratic. On the
contrary, many believe the EPRDF is positioning itself to perpetuate its hegemony. The
fact that the EPRDF, together with its allies, now controls 96.6% of the electoral votes
confirms this belief. This coerced domination is not very different from the formal
adoption of a one-party state; in reality, that is the result. 92

Observer Given 24 Hours to Leave, F.B.I.S., June 24, 1992, at 5. The African-American Institute (AAI), as
part of the international observer group invited by the Transitional Government, responded to the EPRDF's
allegations. AAI asserts that Keller emphasized support for the democratization advances underway in
Ethiopia and denied the EPRDF claim that Keller had expressed support for a reassertion of Oromo identity
and/or Oromo independence. The African-American Institute Responds to False Accusations Against Senior
Members of its Election ObserverDelegation, PRESS RELEASE (AAI, Washington, D.C.), June 25, 1992, at 2.
Chairman of U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Mervyn Dymally, urged Zenawi to
continue dialogue with OLF, while admitting that hopes of seeing Ethiopia succeed in its democratic
experiment have been dashed by the reported widespread government interference in the electoral process.
Parties Call For Annulment of Election Results, F.B.I.S., July 17, 1992, at 3.
88 Parties Callfor Annulment of Election Results, supra note 87.
9 The All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) also announced its withdrawal, claiming that its
candidates were being threatened, beaten, and harassed; there were technical problems in the electoral
process; people had been cajoled into not voting for AAPO; and the candidates were not ready for the
election. Withdrawals From, Postponement of Elections, F.B.I.S., June 18, 1992, at 2.
9 President Says 21 Jun [sic] Elections on Schedule, F.B.I.S., June 19, 1992, at 3.
9' Ethiopia - Prospectsfor Democracy: Hearing on Looking Back and Reaching Forward: Prospects
for Democracy in Ethiopia Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1992) (Testimony of Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs,
Department of State).
92 Under pressure from foreign observers and political parties in the south, the Council of
Representatives has established a neutral committee to rectify electoral anomalies resulting from the June 21
elections. Committee Set Up to Rectify Election 'Anomalies,' F.B.I.S., July 20, 1992, at 4. Ten political
parties, grouped in a Democratic Alliance of Southern Peoples, called for the annulling of the regional
elections of June 21, charging that the poll was rigged by the ruling faction. They claimed that the number
of voting cards issued exceeded the number of voters. The alliance threatened that if their demands were not
met, the 10 would likely renounce their 10 seats in the Council. Parties Call for Annulment of Election
Results, F.B.I.S., July 17, 1992, at 3.
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III. THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
A. The Transition to Democracy and the Rule of Law: Prospects in the Global Context
1. The Challenge of Changingfrom a Liberation Movement to a Democracy
A struggle for liberation, bent on removing oppressive forces from power, unites
the myriad interest groups of a nation. It would seem that such a force should be able to
carry its goals through institutional arrangements and processes, dedicated to democracy.
This unity of all against a common enemy, however, is fleeting. As victory is achieved
or becomes apparent, the struggle for power and the need for self-preservation begin to
replace the lofty ideals of liberation. Sooner or later, unity gives way to dissention,
intolerance, and eventually authoritarianism.
Marina Ottaway, analyzing South Africa's chances for a smooth transition to
democracy, observes that this has been the pattern on the African continent, established
over time, from the independence of Ghana in the late fifties, to that of Zimbabwe in the
early eighties. Without exception, African liberation movements have given rise to singleparty systems, not democracies. 93 While Ethiopia has not had to struggle against colonial
rulers like so many other African nations, popular liberation, from whatever form of
oppression involves similar principles. The elusive key to democracy is maintaining a
balance among competing interest groups. When the approach chosen is hegemony rather
than compromise or consensus, the effect is to promote the interest of the single entity
under which the nation is "unified."
For instance, in late 1990 it became apparent that the African National Congress
(A.N.C.), as a unifying force, was overriding the establishment of various grass-roots
organizations whose existence was deemed crucial for achieving an autonomous civil
society in South Africa.94 Though believing that the A.N.C. may have theoretically
accepted multi-party democracy, Ottaway concluded that by their subordination of all
organizations to the party, "[the A.N.C.] leaders saw themselves as poised to seize state
power." 95 Ottaway distilled the South African dilemma down to a general paradox,
likely present in all liberation movements, that transition from oppression creates a need
for "an all-encompassing, broadly representative front" while "[tiransition to democracy
requires the breaking-up of that movement into a variety of organisations, representing the
different interests and conflicts of a real country." 96 The duality of such a transition
process presents just as great a challenge in Ethiopia.97 If the EPRDF wants Ethiopia to
evolve into a democracy, it must allow dissent, provide an atmosphere for political
competition, and face the challenge of defeating rivals politically, not militarily.
2. The Difficulties of Implementing the Rule of Law
Wiktor Osiatyriski identified two distinct processes that can be followed for
constitution-making in discussing the prospects for a democratic constitution to take root
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in Poland: one is the constitution of principle and the other is the constitution of
compromise.9"
The constitution of principle requires that the constitutional moment be seized
and can usually only be created immediately after a period of crisis and massive change.
At that point, leaders and people genuinely want to learn from past experiences and limit
the possibilities for abuse of power in the future. This process ensures that a commitment
to democracy or self-limitation in a moral sense is not lost.99 Such an atmosphere set the
tone for the United States Constitution. This attitude was present in Poland in 1989, but
the leaders of the change soon became politicians and allowed their thinking to turn to the
"transformation of a society rather than constitutional limitation of power .... ,,100
If the EPRDF, the OLF, and other major forces (without exclusion) had acted
immediately to produce a constitution when the Derg was first overthrown, many of the
various problems subsequently encountered may have been avoided.' 0' Ethiopia has lost
its constitutional moment, however, and missed its chance to create a constitution of
principle based on the idea of limiting power. Thus, Ethiopia must now contend, as
Poland has, with the second type of constitution-making, the constitution of compromise.
The constitution of compromise is the "result of political process rather than of
moral reasoning."' 2 It involves a process of learning from previous mistakes and
shortcomings. 3 This is likely to be a lengthy process and carries the danger that many
voices will go unheard in sorting out interest groups and their rightful influence on the
constitution. Another, more imminent danger in Ethiopia is that no other group now
possesses enough bargaining power to engage in any meaningful process of compromise
with the EPRDF. Much of what has occurred so far is better characterized as acquiescence
to the EPRDF's dictates. Furthermore, even if some compromise occurs, the evidence so
far suggests that the struggle is about who shall control state power rather than how it
should be limited for the benefit of the people. Given these realities, the prospects for a
democratic constitution taking root in Ethiopia appear dim.
B. ParticularIssues for Ethiopia's Prospectsfor Democracy: A Reprise
As earlier noted, the major factors affecting Ethiopia's prospects for democracy
come from the country's history. Although people generally do have the ability to change
past behavior, deeply-rooted traditions are not easily discarded. In Ethiopia these traditions
include the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the EPRDF, the two-thousand-year-old imperial
tradition, and the subsequent totalitarian rule of the Derg. Other factors include EPRDF's
ability to project a hollow democratic form so as to obtain Western economic aid and the
ever present potential for conflict among Ethiopia's many ethnic groups.
1. EPRDF's Lack of Commitment to Democracy
The EPRDF's lack of commitment to democracy, as previously noted, was
evidenced by the exclusion of political parties from the July Conference; the recent
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elections, which were anything but free and fair; the continued clashes with the OLF,
apparently designed to force the OLF to withdraw from the government; and the EPRDF's
strategy of redrawing political boundaries to suit its own political preferences. These
activities by the EPRDF make its governance of Ethiopia contentious and illegitimate.
Although vehemently denied and not immediately visible to the uninitiated eye, these
actions spring from the EPRDF's Marxist-Leninist tradition. Such a tradition and its
philosophical underpinnings are inherently inhospitable to democratic politics and the rule
of law.
The rule of law is the fundamental legal component of the political philosophy
of a liberal democracy. In a revolutionary socialist conception, the "ultimate goal is
radical political transformation leading to the withering away of the state .... "'
including law. Law is thus not just a waste of time, but an unnecessary nuisance that
should be avoided when compliance with it becomes unacceptably burdensome or
inexpedient.° 5 When a group which espoused such views for over two decades, purports
to disown its past and embrace democracy overnight some skepticism is warranted.
Combine this skepticism with the suspicious political maneuverings of the EPRDF over
the past year and a half, and the conjecture that the EPRDF maintains its Marxist-Leninist
posture beneath its claims of being democratic becomes a very strong hypothesis. Failing
to heed these warning signs and take appropriate precautions to avert the danger of
another round of authoritarianism and violence would surely be tragic.
2. Ethiopia's Authoritarian Tradition
EPRDF is not solely to blame for Ethiopia's present predicament. Another of
Ethiopia's hurdles on its path to democracy is the country's authoritarian tradition.
Constitutionalism and the rule of law are alien concepts to all of the people in Ethiopia.
While many people, despite the EPRDF's actions, embrace these concepts as the hope for
the future, many others lack a consciousness of themselves as the source of their
government and legitimate authority. When, for several thousand years, the source of law
has been external to the Ethiopian people, such a radical concept as self-governance is
understandably difficult to fully comprehend. What is thus needed to break the stronghold
of past tradition is continued education of the people by truly free political parties and an
unbiased media.
3. The "No Democracy, No Aid" Factor
When democracy is pushed upon a nation by other nations as a condition for
economic aid, there is a danger that such democracy may last only as long as the cashflow. The likelihood of this type of pressured democracy taking root is slim. U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, testifying before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Africa Subcommittee on September 17, 1992, stated
that U.S. assistance to Ethiopia is dependent upon progress in democracy and human
rights. The United State's commitment to this policy is evidenced by the slow pace of
negotiations for a World Bank $600 million aid package. During the negotiations, many
"raised doubts [about] the transitional government's commitment to building a nationwide
market economy" and about the EPRDF's abandonment of its previous support of
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Albanian Marxism."°6 When Meles Zenawi was finally able to say his government
would sign this agreement with the World Bank, he publicly adopted the liberal economic
policy of the transitional government, marking the first time he specifically abandoned the
socialist economic policies of the once Marxist EPRDF. In another negotiation, only after
the Ethiopian government agreed to devalue the birr, undergoing a "structural adjustment," did the United States agree to spend $161 million over three years to aid Ethiopia.
The forced conformance with United States mandates may help create some space for the
growth of democracy and the United States should not be blamed for wanting some
assurance that its aid is well-spent. Yet, the guarantees being given the United States are
lip-service, at best. Once the money is in hand, Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF will likely
resort to clever subterfuges inconsistent with democratic and constitutional politics.
4. The Ethnic Conflict Factor
The structure of the government as set up by the EPRDF is that of an ethnic
federation. Some Western observers "cannot see a better alternative to 'ethnic federalism',
if it can be implemented carefully, bearing in mind the lessons of Yugoslavia and the
former Soviet Union."'0 7 Yet, "ethnic federalism" has significant pitfalls. To appreciate
this danger, it helps to consider the difference between ethnic federalism and political
federalism as in the United States. In the United States, state boundaries bear little
correlation with deep ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic divisions. Hawaii may be an
exception, but it is an exception that proves the rule. By contrast, under ethnic federalism,
ethnicity represents the principal and decisive basis upon which the federation is
organized. Since the regions to be created under such a system will be identified with a
major ethnic community, each region is likely to see itself as a distinct political entity.
Thus, ethnic federalism may endanger the integrity and stability of the state by helping
rival nationalisms to flourish alongside one another.
Once each ethnic group, regardless of its size, is given significant self-governing
autonomy in its own region, it may be difficult to persuade the ethnic groups to cooperate
with one another for national unity. The old Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia had relied on ethnic federalism as one of the fundamental legal means to solve the
"nationality question." They sought, however, to contain the destructive potential of
ethnonationalism through a civic culture, based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and
the discipline of a unitary party structure - the communist party. As long as these forces
remained powerful, common national interests were maintained. With the demise of the
party and its ideology, however, preoccupation with parochial, ethnic self-interests quickly
led to national disintegration, chaos, and civil war.
Ethiopia faces a serious risk of national disintegration given the de facto
separation of Eritrea and the example this sets for other regions of the country, the
demobilization of the national army in the wake of its defeat, and the absence of strong
national parties. Thus, Ethiopia should consider alternative constitutional models that
accommodate ethnic diversity without impairing national unity. If the federal idea is to
be effective, it requires fostering an awareness that each region, by itself, is relatively
insignificant vis-a-vis the whole. One way to achieve this is to split the large regions into
several smaller units, taking ethnicity into consideration, but also considering history,
economic viability, and other criteria calculated to encourage a feeling of interdependence
and mutual cooperation.
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As things stand, the EPRDF is manipulating ethnicity. Using the same "trick"
of colonizing forces, the EPRDF is implementing a divide-and-rule strategy to maintain
its control of the state. Its aim and hope is that no ethnic group will be able to
successfully challenge the EPRDF, but, instead, will be pitted against one another.
Little, if at all, in the way of democratic progress can be expected amid ethnic
conflict and competition. Ethnic competition invariably involves a zero-sum game. The
Ethiopian people have been ETHIOPIAN for many centuries and yet, now, they must
decide whether they are Tigrayan, Amhara, Oromo, or some other ethnic group when in
reality many of them are legacies of long traditions of intermarriage among ethnic groups.
Unless the elites abandon their ethnic game, there is a real chance that a dissatisfied ethnic
group will eventually gain the momentum to claim state power for itself, putting the
EPRDF on the receiving end of the gun barrel.
IV. CONCLUSION

If these dire predictions are to be proven false, the EPRDF must make significant
changes in its approach to governing. A new conference, embracing all interested political
parties would be a first step in the right direction. The great value of such a step would
be to produce a new constitutional moment, from which a true government of consensus
can be formed. Only such consensus, not a document handed out on the eve of the
conference, or one that is now in the process of being hatched, can lead to a stable
democracy.
With the winds of change sweeping across this continent and others, the trend
toward democracy is epidemic. It would seem that Ethiopia could not help but be caught
up in this massive worldwide movement, which is decidedly anti-authoritarian.
Unfortunately, a leadership capable of shepherding Ethiopia through a democratic
transition is woefully lacking. As a result, the future of democracy in Ethiopia remains
as uncertain as it was upon the fall of the Derg.

